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Summary 
This report scrutinizes the challenges and difficulties inherent to Thailand’s civil-military 
relations as well as continuing obstacles in improving, let alone achieving, security sector 
reform (SSR) in Thailand. Though SSR involves services other than the armed forces (e.g. 
police), this report concentrates on the military since it has been the dominant security 
institution throughout Thai history. Security forces have long had tremendous clout in 
Thailand. Such influence derives from the military’s position since its creation in 1887 as 
guardian of the kingdom. At that time, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) began to depend 
upon a permanent standing army to centralize his control over the entire kingdom. Thai 
nationalism rested on the pride of the kingdom’s having never been colonized and, under 
Chulalongkorn’s son Vajiravudh (Rama VI), the state began to increasingly imbue the 
armed forces’ ideology with royalist nationalism. By the 1920s, the military had grown to 
become a powerful instrument of the monarchy which the latter was ultimately unable to 
dominate. In 1932, military officers led a coup against the absolute monarchy, ending its 
control over Thailand. The armed forces now came to monopolize control over the 
kingdom. Such control lasted initially until 1944.  
From 1944 until 1947, there was a brief period of civilian control during which neither 
the military nor monarchy was influential. Since that time, Thailand has not witnessed 
such strong civilian supremacy. Royalists and the military overthrew Thailand’s 
democracy in 1947 and together dominated Thai politics until 1951. In that year, while 
the king was abroad, the military abrogated the constitution and returned to monopolize 
all power, with the king left to being a mere figurehead. In 1957, a more pro-royalist 
military faction overthrew the Thai government. The new leadership elevated the role of 
King Bhumipol so that the monarch would help build public support for the new military 
regime. Upon the death of Dictator Gen. Sarit Thanarat in 1963, however, King Bhumipol 
was able to step into the political vacuum and vastly expand his power. Though the 
military continued to administer Thailand, its hold on power depended upon the 
legitimacy bestowed upon it by the palace. Thus a monarch-beholden bureaucratic polity 
controlled the country.  
Despite a brief and superficial period of elected civilian rule from 1973 until 1976, 
power-sharing between the monarchy and military (with the latter as junior partner) 
continued until 1988. By this time, popular demands made it necessary to allow elected 
civilians to lead the government once and for all. However, in 1991 the monarch 
supported a military coup which toppled the elected regime. The new military 
government was quite unpopular and, in the aftermath of a massacre of civilian protestors 
by soldiers in May 1992, it resigned following intervention by the king. There followed 14 
years of democracy in Thailand. After 1992, the military’s image was tainted thanks to the 
negative image it had created for itself during the 1992 massacre of protestors. But during 
the 1990s, retired General Prem Tinsulanond, in his capacity as Chairman of Thailand’s 
Privy Council (which advises the king), saw to it that his loyalists became senior officers 
in Thailand’s armed forces. In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra became Prime Minister. He 
challenged Prem by building up his own faction of influence within the security sector. 
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Thaksin also came to incur the dislike of the palace. Moreover, the military, as an 
institution, had, over the years, built up its own economic empire and it was becoming 
threatened by Thaksin. Ultimately, Thaksin was overthrown in a military coup in 2006, 
and the security sector came to exert much greater influence over the Thai polity. The 
military ceded power to a pro-Thaksin elected government in early 2008. However that 
government was eventually ousted by Thailand’s judiciary and, in December that year, an 
anti-Thaksin government was cobbled together in the home of Thailand’s army 
commander. This apparent “silent” coup exacerbated Thailand’s political polarization 
between supporters and opponents of Thaksin, leading eventually to the military’s bloody 
quelling of two pro-Thaksin demonstrations in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, a new pro-
Thaksin political party called Puea Thai swept to office in a landslide election and 
Thaksin’s sister Yingluck became Prime Minister. Thaksin himself, barred from office due 
to an earlier court conviction, remains in exile. Despite Puea Thai’s landslide victory, 
Thailand’s military leadership has remained adamantly opposed to Thaksin – and the 
Prime Minister has few means of controlling active-duty military opponents. 
Today, in 2013, as with many young democracies throughout the world, Thailand has 
an oversized security sector which, in most matters, is not accountable to civilian 
authorities. Clearly, security sector reform would do much to demilitarize the country, 
diminish the military’s grip on Thai politics, improve transparency and ultimately 
enhance democratic governance over Thailand’s security sector. But powerful military 
intransigence will probably hinder any such reform, at least in the short term. Such 
intransigence derives from the armed forces’ enormous clout today in Thai politics and 
society and such clout owes to five factors. First, the military has long been an entrenched, 
powerful actor in Thai society. Second, since 2004 the military has spearheaded efforts at 
fighting insurgency in Thailand’s far South. Third, the 2006 coup which ousted Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the military has, since then, enhanced its powers and 
privileges while beefing up its might in opposition to any perceived threat from Thaksin, 
his Puea Thai political party and his “Red Shirt” protest movement. Forth, since 2008 the 
military has directed security efforts along the Thai-Cambodian border in light of 
occasional Cambodian military incursions relating to a disputed area of territory. Fifth, 
the armed forces guarantee the security for the king (and its own interests) above any 
goals of protecting democracy. Indeed, the military has, since 1887, taken a leading role in 
safeguarding the Thai state. 
In Thailand, the monarch, his Privy Council, and most of the security sector (though 
many police support Thaksin) are outside the purview of control by elected civilians. 
Prior to 2001, elected civilians were scattered amidst weakly-cohering political parties in 
parliament. After the election of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001, he was able to dominate the 
executive, legislative, and parts of the judicial branches of government until his ouster in 
the 2006 coup. Following the 2008 return to democracy, Thaksin indirectly dominated the 
executive and legislative branches. With the 2011 landslide election of the pro-Thaksin 
Puea Thai party, Thaksin’s forces (through his sister) once again came to hold sway – 
though this power is limited. Indeed, with Thaksin (and his sister Prime Minister 
Yingluck Shinawatra) dominating the executive and legislative branches, any-Thaksin 
royalists control most of the security sector. As such, the armed forces have been 
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insulated from civilian control. Despite the king’s advanced age and ill health, his position 
continues to be quite strong. Moreover, the opposition of the king (and others in the 
palace) to Thaksin Shinawatra remains clear. In 2008 and 2010, members of the royal 
family on two occasions attended the funerals of those opposed to Thaksin. Meanwhile, 
the king has steadfastly refused to pardon Thaksin for a previous court conviction. The 
military leadership is extremely loyal to the king – not to Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra. 
This report makes clear that since the attempted security sector reforms of the late 
1990s, Thailand has been moving away from bringing the country towards any form of 
institutionalized civilian control over the military. Under Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra (2001-2006), civilian control became merely institutionalized in the person of 
Thaksin. In the aftermath of the 2006 coup which ousted Thaksin, military powers were 
enhanced in several decision-making areas. Since the return to democracy in early 2008, 
though the military continues to appear as subordinate to the civilian Prime Minister, it is 
really only beholden to the king, Privy Council Chair or itself. Such military prowess 
exists formally, as a result of newly enshrined powers, or informally, notwithstanding the 
explicit powers of civilian leaders. 
Attempts by international entities to initiate security sector reform in Thailand have 
thus far been fruitless. During the Cold War, US attempts at SSR in Thailand were 
stymied by greater priority in Washington towards building an alliance against 
communism. Since the end of the Cold War Thai soldiers have been willing to participate 
in security sector trainings, but have been less willing to inculcate security sector reform 
“values”. Since 2006, Thailand has increasingly diversified its sources of military supplies 
and trainings – especially turning to China. Moreover, China has not sought to mold 
Thailand towards having a more democratic security sector. Because of China’s 
unconditional assistance, efforts at SSR in Thailand, most prominently pushed by the 
United States, but also encouraged by others in the international community, may 
become meaningless. 
In the short-term, international entities (mostly Western states or international 
organizations such as the United Nations) must understand that any move towards 
massive reforms in Thailand’s security sector will be difficult to achieve. This is because 
Thailand‘s current political situation is politically polarized and prone to potential chaos, 
given the schism in the country surrounding former Prime Minister Thaksin. Senior 
military personnel, aligned with autocratic royalists, oppose the democratically-elected 
forces of Thaksin. They are thus unwilling to accept security sector reforms which might 
enhance the power of current Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra (Thaksin’s sister) over 
the armed forces (given their perception that she is a mere vehicle for Thaksin). In fact 
she has generally remained loyal and supportive of her brother’s political agenda. 
Thaksin, however, has a loyal coterie of leading politicians (aside from Yingluck) who 
support his goals and regularly visit him abroad. Furthermore, though Thaksin remains 
in exile, he regularly skypes into Yingluck’s cabinet meetings. As for the police, Thaksin 
continues to maintain personal control over much of them.  
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Only in the long term massive changes in security sector reform will be possible. 
Thailand will not be ready to seriously commence security sector reform until stability 
returns to the country, democracy becomes more advanced, and the security sector is no 
longer protected from reform because of its close association with the palace. Yet SSR in 
Thailand must be a domestic-led process: as during the 1990s, Thai military elites will 
insist upon and maintain “ownership” over any new SSR processes which transpire rather 
than allowing Western states which encourage SSR (e.g. the USA) to keep control over 
such reforms. 
In sum, neither Thaksin nor his opponents seem to actually favor sweeping, 
institutionalized reforms in the security sector. Where royalists want to maintain a 
powerful, partisan security sector to protect them against Thaksin while Thaksin himself 
would seek to exert personalist rather than institutional control over the military, then 
there will not be any genuine moves in Thailand towards security sector reform soon. 
Ultimately, Thailand represents the case of a country where democratic civilian control 
over the security sector has thus far remained elusive. Indeed, before any specific security 
sector reform can come to Thailand, there needs to be an elite united and willing to push 
for and accept these reforms.  
 
  
Contents 
 
 
1.  Introduction 1 
 
2. Thailand’s Security Sector 3 
 
3. History of Civil-Military Relations in Thailand 5 
3.1 1887-1992 5 
3.2 1992 to the Present 10 
 
4. Efforts at Security Sector Reform (1992-2006) 12 
 
5. The Post-2006 Balance of Power between the Security and Civilian Sector 18 
 
6. Current State of Civilian Control 21 
 
7. International Contributions to Security Sector Reform 23 
 
8. Conclusion: What Can Be Done 27 
 
Bibliography 30 
Abbreviations 37 
 
 

  
1.  Introduction 
This report focuses upon the challenges Thailand faces in achieving civilian control over 
its military. In contemporary Thailand, civilian control is incomplete at best and abortive 
at worst. Especially since the personalized politicization of the security sector under Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (beginning in 2002) and the military coup of 2006, serious 
moves towards security sector reform and professionalism have been shelved. With three 
conflicts occurring simultaneously at the national, border and ethnic/religious levels, a 
rationalization for reform at this time has fallen upon deaf ears. Nevertheless, 
international donors and domestic, epistemic communities have persisted in pushing for 
a streamlining of the country’s security sector. 
Thailand’s military (and police) remain oversized, top-heavy in terms of the 
proportion of officers to enlisted personnel, and lacking in efficiency. Security sector 
reforms begun in the 1990s, which aimed towards making the military and police more 
professional, capable, and less corrupt, continue to be lost in transition. Corruption, other 
criminal activities, human rights violations, and legal impunity in high-risk situations 
remain endemic problems among the security services. Other obstacles include the small 
number of women in the security sector, militarism, political activism, and active 
resistance to democratic civilian control. 
This report scrutinizes the challenges and difficulties inherent to Thailand’s civil-
military relations as well as continuing obstacles in improving, let alone achieving, 
security sector reform in Thailand. International and domestic actors have sought to 
ensure democratic civilian supremacy over the security sector, improve capacity and 
cohesion, and finally alter the traditional Thai military role from being an instrument of 
repression ready to involve itself in politics towards becoming more apolitical, 
streamlined, and law-abiding. In line with such objectives, the theoretical tenets of SSR 
stress an adherence to transparency, good governance, rule of law, civilian monitoring, 
and building public trust and confidence in the security sector. As such, SSR can be seen as 
closely integrated with human security (OECD 2007: 11). Though such objectives seem 
worthy in theory, they are often in practice quite difficult to achieve – especially when 
security forces are called out to preserve order. And indeed, since the sudden heightening of 
insurgency in Thailand’s far South in 2004, the coup in 2006, the outbreak of border 
violence with Cambodia in 2008, and large-scale anti-government demonstrations in 2010, 
there has been an escalation in the budgeting for and use of force by the security sector.  
This use of force has paralleled a spiraling political divide in Thailand, whereby the 
military and police are perceived as being on opposing sides. Moreover, the failure of any 
prosecutions of army personnel and the fact that no security sector officials have ever 
been punished for human rights violations attests to the continuing legal impunity of 
members of the security sector. The perceived politicization and corruption of the 
security sector; its role in the 2006 coup; its growing budget; use of repression; and 
apparent insulation from civilian control have only helped to diminish civilian trust in the 
military as an effective protector of democracy and non-partisan guardian of the people. 
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Nevertheless, the military’s 2011 role in responding to a national disaster has helped it 
regain some public support (Cole/Sciacchitano 2012). 
This report proceeds in four parts. First, it examines the evolution of Thailand’s 
military, explaining the historical basis for the current balance of power between civilians 
and the armed forces, and especially how the army has formed the backbone mechanism 
of the Thai security state. Second, the report examines how and in what areas military 
incisions in decision-making have undermined civilian control. Third, the report looks at 
past and present efforts at security sector reform, and what, if anything has stymied 
progress on this front. Fourth and finally, the analysis offers conclusions and policy 
recommendations in an effort to revitalize security sector reform. Thailand represents an 
anomaly given that it possesses a constitutional monarchy, where the monarch stands far 
above the polity, can exert both constitutional and extra-constitutional power, is the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces (including the police); and is the entity to 
which the security sector gives its primary obedience, over the Prime Minister, 
constitution, and democracy. As such, understanding the power of Thailand’s armed 
forces involves a comprehension of the cyclical political triangulation of power among 
elected civilians (particularly the Prime Minister); the military and police; and the 
monarch. This report argues that events in history, having produced strong and 
influential armed forces (and police), make a reversal of this situation difficult to 
achieve in the short run. For this very reason, it is perhaps essential that Thailand adopt 
a policy of security sector improvements – especially an adherence to civilian control 
over the military – sooner rather than later. However the security sector will most 
probably not be tamed until the current national conflict simmers down and the up-
coming monarchical succession passes smoothly. Perhaps, only then will security sector 
streamlining begin to see some successes. Where donors are involved in security sector 
reform, there needs to be more balance in “local ownership” of donor-directed security 
sector reform programs so that both the international group and local (state) recipient 
of the aforementioned assistance are satisfied. 
Though promoters of security sector reform inside and outside of Thailand have a 
noble mission in seeking to make Thailand’s security sector more efficient, capable and 
mindful of democracy, such advocates will have to be patient, at least until this current 
period of political instability, uncertainty and regional insurgency in Thailand diminishes. 
Even then it might be unrealistic to assume that international and domestic efforts to 
transform the country’s security sector will be successful. Regarding policy advice, donors 
seeking security sector reform in Thailand are aiming to keep a strategically-situated 
country in mainland Southeast Asia stable and orderly while making its security sector 
more efficient and much more beholden to democratic civilian control. In the years since 
the 2006 coup, such efforts have been illusory. 
Regarding methodology, this report is based upon secondary literature and official 
documents. Some of these are in Thai and others in English. The report has its drawbacks. 
It does not utilize primary source materials such as interviews and concentrates upon 
security sector assistance from the United States. 
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Ultimately, Thailand represents the case of a country where democratic civilian 
control over the military has thus far remained elusive. In such a case, any drastic changes 
in the security sector itself may entail, at least to some extent, a decoupling of the military 
from the monarchy. The goal is to make the security sector much more apolitical and less 
beholden to only monarchical objectives. But such a goal is still a long way off. At this 
point in time, advocates for security sector reform in Thailand can only expect “baby 
steps” towards any real streamlining of the security sector.  
2. Thailand’s Security Sector 
The security sector in Thailand today includes the royal Thai armed forces headquarters, 
the army, the navy (which also includes coast guards and marines), the air force, the police 
(which also includes border guards and customs authorities), state-directed paramilitaries 
(including reserve or local security units), militias, and royal guards. In addition, police and 
military officials each have their intelligence and secret services. These organizations are 
formally directed by the executive branch through the Ministry of Defense (for the armed 
forces), and the Office of the Prime Minister (for the police), with the National Security 
Council as an advisory board. In general, there have been incidents where officials within all 
parts of this security sector have engaged in human rights violations and corruption. 
Moreover, Thai security institutions have generally suffered from a lack of accountability 
and transparency. Reflecting this trend, in 2013, Transparency International reported that 
Thailand “is at high risk of corruption in the defence sector” (TI 2013). 
Moreover, since 1932, senior brass in Thailand’s security sector have enjoyed relatively 
large budgets and presided over an enormous economic empire. Deriving from an early 
economic policy of state-dominated bureaucratic capitalism, military and police officers 
have taken leading roles in Thai state parastatals. These have included Thai Airways 
International, the Thai Port Authority, Thai Military Bank, Airports of Thailand, the 
Telephones Authority of Thailand, television channel five and other state enterprises. 
Senior military and police officials have also sat on the boards of directors of major 
private banks such as Bank of Ayutthaya and Bangkok Bank. Thanks to the military’s 
leading role in development, they also acquired major real estate holdings. Despite the 
apparent demilitarization in the 1990s, active-duty or retired senior military or police 
officials have maintained their presence on many boards of directors in the 1990s and 
2000s. The 2006 coup helped to temporarily reassert military influence over the economy. 
In 2013, though civilians have penetrated into traditional investment centers of the 
security sector (e.g. Thai Military Bank), the latter continues to enjoy a heightened budget 
and multiplicity of economic dividends (Lopez 2007; Kharabi 2010: 27). 
The predominant security institution in Thailand is the Royal Thai Army. Regarding 
budgeting, labor capacity, infrastructure/weaponry allocation, and simple tradition, the 
Royal Thai Army (RTA) is the largest and most powerful arm of Thailand’s security 
sector – which makes the army chief the most powerful security official. There is often 
overlap between the missions of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters and the 
Royal Thai Army (e.g. both see their missions as including foreign peacekeeping). This 
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serves the purpose of further weakening the headquarters commander, given that 
infrastructure, resources, and tradition already favor the army commander.  
As for the Royal Thai Police (RTP), it was once a part of the Ministry of the Interior. 
In the 1950s, it came to directly compete with the army in terms of size and firepower but 
afterwards, was weakened by army dictators. Moreover, since 1998 the police have 
operated directly under the Office of Prime Minister. In 2001 Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, himself a former police officer, began to resurrect the police budget, politisize 
it and cultivate a following among Thai police officers (Haanstad 2008: 77). In 2013, most 
RTP officers tend to favor Thaksin and his sister, current Prime Minister Yingluck 
Shinawatra. Though corruption, excessive use of force, torture, and cronyism have been 
endemic in all Thai security institutions, the RTP is most infamous for engaging in such 
behavior – surpassed only by the paramilitaries. Ultimately there exists in the RTP a 
history of “excess, malfeasance and resistance to change” (Lim 2010). Since this report 
focuses upon Thailand’s military, a more detailed examination of the Royal Thai Police 
will be provided in an upcoming PRIF Report. 
Despite having relatively large army and police forces, Thailand has increasingly relied 
on paramilitary organizations to work alongside its more formal security sector 
(Ball/Mathieson 2007: 23). These paramilitaries are not independent militias but rather 
are directed by the state. The major paramilitaries today are the Tor Chor Dor (Border 
Patrol Police); Or Sor (Volunteer Defense Corps); the Thahan Prahan (Rangers); Chor 
Ror Bor (Self-Defense Volunteers); and Or Ror Bor (Village Protection Volunteers). To 
some degree, all of these forces have been involved in both Thailand’s 2003 drug war 
(which resulted in approximately 3000 people executed extra-judicially); and current 
counter-insurgency operations in the far South. The Border Patrol Police oversees the 
Self-Defense Volunteers, both of which are under the formal control of the Royal Thai 
Police. Nevertheless, both are under the operational control of the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces Headquarters. Meanwhile, the Rangers and Village Protection Volunteers are 
directed by the army. Finally, the Village Protection Volunteers, though officially under 
the Ministry of Interior, are operationally controlled by the army. Paramilitaries have a 
worse record than other security forces when it comes to corruption, illegal behavior and 
human rights violations. It has been alleged that the Border Patrol Police has been 
responsible for at least 400 cases of human rights violations from 1988 until 2008 (Macan-
Markar 2008). Volunteer Defense officials have been implicated in criminal activities; 
have demanded bribes from refugees in refugee camps; have allegedly engaged in rape of 
refugees and have been responsible for human rights violations (Ball/Mathieson 2007: 1-4, 
187-188; ICG 2007: 14-15). Rangers have the worst human rights reputation and have also 
allegedly worked with provincial mafias (ICG 2007: 4-13). A more detailed examination 
of Thai paramilitaries and militias will be provided in an upcoming PRIF Report. 
In practice, Thailand’s justice system offers little oversight of potential illegalities by 
security sector personnel. Criminal courts, courts of justice, and administrative courts are 
formally the venues where cases against security officials can be brought. Yet in Thailand’s 
history, only low-ranking soldiers or police officials have ever been indicted for crimes, 
and very few of these have ever been convicted. The military has its own judicial system as 
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well, but crimes allegedly committed against civilians have never been successfully 
prosecuted in military courts. Finally, the Department of Special Investigations and the 
Human Rights Commission have the power to forward cases against security officials to 
the judiciary. However, both institutions suffer from political manipulation and a 
reluctance to challenge the armed forces. 
Since 1932, Thailand has had 18 different constitutions, often enacted by the rise of 
different military factions (with monarchical support). The military’s role in the drafting 
of new constitutions has generally resulted in the insulation of the armed forces from 
civilian control – except where the king supports coercive sanctioning against military 
abuses by civilians. In addition, the Criminal Code, Martial Law Act, Emergency Decree, 
Internal Security Act and Defense Act have helped to rationalize and offer loopholes for 
security officials to violate human rights and political freedom with relative legal 
impunity (Waitoolkiat/Chambers 2013: 53-65).  
3. History of Civil-Military Relations in Thailand 
3.1 1887-1992 
Before 1932 
Until 1932, Thailand, never colonized, was directly under monarchical absolutism. In the 
late nineteenth century, a long, self-reinforcing path of civil-military relations emerged in 
which the armed forces became a major entity for shaping the kingdom and ultimately 
exerting control over civilians. 1887 marked the starting point of this path. In that year, 
King Chulalongkorn established centralized permanent armed forces under a single 
military commander and established a Military Affairs Department with a cadet school 
(Royal Thai Army, 100 Years: 48). A strong security sector was necessary to guarantee the 
survival of the Thai monarchy in the face of enemy “otherness” on all of Thailand’s frontiers 
(Winichagul 1994: 167). “Otherness” perceptions involved a fear of outsiders or even 
ideologies viewed as potentially destructive to the Thai Buddhist kingdom. The notion of 
Thai “We-ness” versus foreign “Otherness” was ensconced in both the military’s self-
identity and in the perception of most Thais that the armed forces were guardians of the 
kingdom (Winichagul 1994: 167). Such “otherness” perceptions can be seen with regard to 
feelings of loathing which many Thai elites have held towards the abortive Thai Communist 
Party, Thai Malay-Muslims, Cambodians, Burmese, Vietnamese and northern “hill-tribes”.  
The purpose of the new permanent military was to consolidate monarchical power 
within the kingdom, guaranteeing “internal security” (Isarapakdi 1989: 67). In seeking to 
quell domestic resistance to centralized control, the palace quintupled the budget for this 
new military. From these inauspicious beginnings as a mechanism of the absolute 
monarchy with no external security functions, the armed forces would later advance “to 
dominate the domestic political process” (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 5). As such, 1887-1932 
saw the evolution of an asymmetrical power-sharing relationship between the monarchy 
and military, with the latter as junior partner (Phongpaichit/Baker 1995: 230). 
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Under King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), the state created the Council of National 
Defense, which “put military affairs on a governmental footing approximately equal to all 
civil affairs combined” (Wilson 1962: 170). Perhaps to build his support among soldiers 
and heighten Siam’s military clout, Vajiravudh granted even more budgetary funding “to 
build up a strong war machine” though this starved funding for “economic reform” 
(Graham 1924: 317-318). Despite his nurturing of military might, Vajiravudh’s reign was 
shaken by at least two military coup plots (Baker/Phongpaichit 2005: 106). His successor 
King Prajadhipok (1925-1935), continued his brother’s policy of increasing military 
prerogatives, a phenomenon, which, in the 1920s, witnessed a growing functional division 
between civilians and soldiers. Yet royal relatives still held top armed forces postings, 
forcing a glass ceiling upon ambitious officers seeking career advancement. By 1930, 
Thailand was confronted with a sudden downturn in the global economy. The depression 
led to enormous budget cuts, including at the Ministry of Defense (Wilson 1962: 173). 
Amidst the economic crisis, the state ushered in higher taxes on civil servants, including 
soldiers (Barme 1993: 66). By 1932, with intensifying domestic discontent, the absolute 
monarchy found itself ever more reliant on its powerful military to maintain order.  
In 1932 a military coup group overthrew monarchical absolutism, facilitating the 
enactment of the country’s first constitution and the holding of its first general elections. 
Yet the transition did not rupture the pre-existing evolution of escalating armed forces 
authority (Wilson 1962: 171). Thus, 1932 offered Thailand its first opportunity at a critical 
juncture to achieve civilian control, but instead the military monopolized power. Though a 
superficial democracy functioned until 1938 (followed by the 1938-1944 martial law years), 
the 1932 fall of the absolute monarchy offered the military unbridled “increasing returns” – 
enhancing its power without monarchical or civilian supervision. Indeed, post-1932 elected 
government amounted to a mere formality as power was informally concentrated in the 
military alone. Military factionalism intensified, giving way to three coup attempts, but 
power was eventually centered in the clique of Gen. Phibul Songkram. During this time, all 
aspects of decision-making were effectively decided by active-duty senior military officers 
holding the position of Prime Minister simultaneously. Moreover, military expenditures 
reached 33 percent of the national budget, the highest amount ever attained (Samudavanija 
1982: 12). Meanwhile, active-duty soldiers were given an ever-higher number of civilian 
administrative positions. In the cabinet the number of military officers holding portfolios 
rose from 7 out of 15 or 46.6% to 16 out of 26 or 61.5% (Chambers 2009: 26-27). Ultimately, 
the period 1932-1944 entrenched a factionalized military as an essential authoritarian actor 
in society while the monarchy became a very feeble institution.  
1944-1947 
In 1944, four events occurred which severely weakened the armed forces. First, 1944 
witnessed worsening military fortunes for Japan (with whom Thailand was allied during 
World War II). Second, Thailand’s economy was deteriorating, creating domestic unrest 
and disorder. Third, in July 1944, pro-Axis military Prime Minister Phibul Songkram was 
forced to resign. Fourth, the anti-Axis civilian Pridi Panomyong gained indirect control of 
Thai politics. Pridi, leading other civilian elite politicians, worked to shore up civilian 
supremacy. As Prime Minister in 1946, he forcibly retired any officers thought to be pro-
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Phibul while increasing numbers of pro-Pridi officers in mid-ranking military positions 
(Bamrungsuk 1988: 86). He furthermore moved to severely reduce the military’s budget 
(particularly that of the Army). Moreover, he cut short any parades or military glamour 
which the Army had enjoyed under Phibul (Venkataramani 1992: 258). Finally, Pridi 
ensured the enactment of a constitution which prevented active-duty soldiers from serving 
in civilian posts. In this way, Pridi enhanced civilian political influence while the military 
and monarchy were quite weak (the monarchy still lacked a king who had come of age). Yet 
by mid-1946, royalists and civilian oligarchs had become suspicious as to whether Pridi 
might be attempting to consolidate his personal control. In May, he was indirectly 
implicated in the sudden death of King Ananda. With civilian elites increasingly divided 
and soldiers increasingly united against Pridi, political instability intensified. Pridi soon left 
the country but his political party continued to dominate the government. However, a 1947 
military coup – encouraged by the palace – voided the 1946 constitution and eliminated 
Thailand’s brief experiment with civilian control (Handley 2006: 88).  
1947-1957 
The 1947 military putsch shattered civilian supremacy and re-established the power-sharing 
arrangement between the monarchy and a particular military faction.1 Other than force of 
arms and support from the palace, the coup group solidified its control thanks partly to 
acquiescence from the United States, which, amidst an emerging Cold War in 1947, had 
become worried about political instability in Southeast Asia. The Coup Group’s strong anti-
Communist stance upon coming to power had legitimated its control in the eyes of 
Washington (Venkataramani 1992: 267-270). Moreover, after 1947, enhanced US backing 
was essential in entrenching the armed forces as a dominant political actor (Fineman 1997: 
3). US military assistance to the Thai armed forces skyrocketed from $4.5 million in 1951 to 
$55.8 million in 1953, a figure 2.46 times higher than the Thai defense budget. US military 
assistance and grant aid remained high until 1976 (Bamrungsuk 1988: 195). After Vietnam’s 
1978 invasion of Cambodia, US military aid again poured into Thailand and such assistance 
remained high until 1987, amidst moves towards regional stability (Hagelin 1988: 481).  
The prolonged deliveries of such aid contributed to the US becoming a sort of second 
patron for the military – after the palace. Only with the end of the Cold War in 1991 did 
such patronage begin to diminish.  
The palace-military power-sharing arrangement which re-emerged after 1947 was 
mostly dominated by the monarch but sometimes by the military. Thus, from 1947 to 1951, 
the monarchy was the dominant actor in this equation. Yet following another coup, from 
1951 to 1957, the armed forces, under the army faction Soi Rajakru, again became the 
principal actor. 
 
 
1  During this time, a weak half-elected legislature was allowed to exist and superficial elections were 
intermittently held. 
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1957-1973 
Following a 1957 coup, again incited by the king, another military faction led by Gen. 
Sarit Thanarat came to overshadow the armed forces. Sarit elevated the power of the 
monarchy (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 51-54, 181). The 1963 death of Sarit facilitated the rise 
of Sarit’s lieutenants Gen. Thanom Kittikachorn and Gen. Praphas Charusatien, who 
together became the dominant military faction, though the monarchy towered over them 
in political influence (Handley 2006: 156-157). 
In 1969, following mostly sham elections, Thanom was appointed Prime Minister. By 
1973, increasing military disunity as well as intensified pressures for political change from 
students seeking to revitalize the civilian control of 1944-1947 led to greater political 
turmoil. In October 1973, though the military’s killings of student protests ostensibly set 
the scene, military disunity as well as the King’s decision to support Army Commander 
Gen. Krit Sivara against Thanom/Praphas effectively forced the latter from power 
(Morrell/Samudavanija 1981: 141). 
1973-1976 
From 1973-76, the palace and military continued to share power, though there were three 
changes. First, a new faction – the Krit Sivara clique – dominated the armed forces. 
Second, in post-1973 Thailand, the monarch became more influential than ever before: 
neither soldiers nor civilians could trump his clout (Morrell/Samudavanija 1981: 68, 148). 
Indeed, from 1973 to 1975, the king appointed a palace loyalist as Prime Minister. Third, 
although from 1975 to 1976 elected civilians administered Thailand; informal power 
remained with the monarch and the military. Yet the death of Krit in April 1976 and 
retirement of Krit’s successor (a Krit loyalist) as Army Commander in October 1976 
weakened the influence of the Krit faction. This facilitated a palace-backed 1976 military 
coup which halted Thai democracy (Wright 1991: 250-252).  
1976-1988 
1976 saw the reestablishment of direct control by the monarch and military. Military 
factionalism thereupon reasserted itself, precipitating a coup in 1977. In 1980, the king 
supported the appointment of arch-royalist Gen. Prem Tinsulanond as Thailand’s new 
unelected Prime Minister and Army Commander concurrently.  
From 1980 to 1988 Prem and his loose clique dominated the armed forces while a 
weakly-institutionalized, civilian Lower House was permitted to exist (Neher 1992: 594). 
1988-1991 
In 1988, civilian elites became increasingly united in favor of an elected Prime Minister 
and the military was facing diminished security concerns. With the king supporting 
regime change, Prem stood aside and allowed an elected Prime Minister (ret. Gen. 
Chatchai Chunhavan) to assume the premiership, a post which he held for three years. 
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Meanwhile, Prem joined the King’s Privy Council in 1988 but continued to exercise 
influence over the military. During this time, united armed forces and the king were 
increasingly suspicious of the new premier. In addition the Senate continued to be 
composed of mostly-military appointees. Moreover, the military enjoyed virtual 
autonomy in the area of internal security. Quarreling between Chatchai and Army 
Commander Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon over weapons purchases and military 
perceptions of civilian interference in its domain eventually led to a palace-supported 
coup on February 21, 1991 (Phongpaichit/Baker 1995: 354). Thus ended the fourth 
attempt at a critical juncture aimed at establishing long-term civilian control.  
1991-1992 
Suchinda’s 1991 coup group worked to cement its power over Thai politics, building its 
own political party and competing in March 1992 elections. The elections resulted in 
Suchinda himself being elevated to the post of Prime Minister and it appeared certain that 
the military would further extend its power. However, mass civilian protests commenced 
in May 1992 aimed at forcing Suchinda from office. As the armed forces sought to repress 
the demonstrations, soldiers killed numerous protestors and the king intervened to ease 
Suchinda out of office and his faction out of power (Maisrikrod 1992: 32-33). The army’s 
repression of demonstrators became carved into the memory of Thais as “Black May”.  
Ultimately, modern civil-military relations in Thailand emerged out of the 1887-1992 
period. This era witnessed the absolute monarchy’s creation of the armed forces in 1887; 
the latter’s rise to become a pliant power-sharing partner of monarchical supremacy; the 
military’s 1932 monopolization of political power; the 1947 re-emergence of palace-
military power-sharing; and finally the ascendance of the monarchy as the dominant 
actor over both soldiers and civilians.  
Out of this era, seven lasting legacies developed which had an enormous impact upon 
Thai civil-military relations in the post-1992 era: a monarchy with deeply-ingrained 
power over Thai society; a traditionally-authoritarian military subservient to the 
monarchy2 which concentrated on internal security; no colonial history; a perceived need 
for security to guard against enemy “otherness”, a very weak and intermittent history of 
democracy dominated by civilian elites; a socio-economic divide between rich and poor;3 
 
 
2  Evidence of the King’s complicity in helping to sponsor successful coups can be found in the regime 
changes of 1947, 1957, 1973, 1976, 1980, 1991, 1992, 2006 and the military’s involvement in the 
government changes of 1997 and 2008. See Handley 2006: 136, 138, 278, 338, 356; Chaiching 2010: 166, 
171; Kulick/Wilson 1992: 22-23; McCargo 2005: 510-511; Hewison 2007: 204; Political Prisoners 2013 (1); 
Political Prisoners 2013 (2). 
3  Rapid economic growth initially widened the disparity between rich and poor, aggravated social tensions, 
made the Communist Party of Thailand more popular and rationalized greater armed forces clout for 
purposes of internal security. More recently, the impoverished found a champion in Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, who, following his accession to office, instituted policies to benefit poor people. As 
Walker has argued, the impoverished are not as desperately poor as before. Rural incomes have grown 
and rural folk have demanded not “basic subsistence” but more “political inclusion” (Walker 2010). The 
fact that Thaksin delivered on his populist promises and gave the poor a sense of empowerment helped 
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and finally, beginning in 1947, a close alliance with the United States, which provided 
much military assistance and guaranteed external security, while the Thai military 
concentrated on internal security. Together, these legacies ensured that Thai military 
influence would persevere thanks to its close ties with the palace and the United States, 
especially during the Cold War, and that civilian control would be slow to emerge. 
In sum, “otherness”, World War II, the Cold War and counter-insurgency helped to 
rationalize and cement the role of the armed forces and police as crucial players on the 
Thai political stage. But their power increasingly depended upon the legitimacy bestowed 
upon them by the monarch. Ultimately, after 1963, there came to be an asymmetrical 
alliance between king, military and police with the former acting as senior partner which 
dominated Thailand.  
3.2 1992 to the Present  
However, in the aftermath of “Black May”, the public image of the armed forces was 
significantly tarnished, which helped to weaken it as a political actor. Indeed, it even 
seemed to become de-politicized, though this was not the case. In fact, the discrediting 
helped to prevent any strong active-duty military leader from emerging for the next 14 
years. Though active duty military factions lost much political influence, in their stead the 
Privy Council under ret. Gen. (and former Prime Minister) Prem Tinsulanond gained 
much sway over the armed forces. As such, during the 1990s, Prem was referred to as 
Thailand‘s surrogate strongman (Samudavanija 1997: 56). Officers close to Prem or who 
earned his trust ascended to leading military positions. This included Army Commanders 
Gens. Wimol Wongwanich (1992-95), and Surayud Chulanond (1998-2002). During this 
time, former Army Commander (ret. Gen.) Chavalit Yonchaiyudh also exercised 
substantial though lesser influence over the military. He served as Prime Minister (1996-
1997). But Chavalit‘s influence rapidly diminished in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, during which he resigned as Prime Minister amidst the collapse of his coalition.  
Moreover, Privy Council Prem – with active support from the king – interfered in 
parliamentary politics in November 1997 by influencing 12 members of the Prajakorn 
Thai party to defect from the ruling coalition and join the opposition, thus enabling the 
Democrat Party to form a coalition government (McCargo 2005: 510). Democrat Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai now also served as Defense Minister. In 1998, with the pro-Prem 
Surayudh Chulanondh appointed as Army Commander, Prem and his faction of both 
retired and active-duty military officers were able to exercise more authority than ever 
over Thailand‘s armed forces. Yet this Prem-Surayudh pull over the security sector lasted 
only until the rise of (police lieutenant colonel) Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001. As Prime 
Minister from 2001 until 2006, Thaksin succeeded in personalizing control over the Royal 
 
 
him turn a voting majority into a powerful, loyal constituency in elections (Laothamatas 2006). Yet his 
populism alienated urban, middle class Thais. Eventually, Thaksin’s move towards personalized, populist 
authoritarianism saw a spiraling of divisions between mostly rural lower classes and mostly urban middle 
and upper classes, a phenomenon which contributed to the latter’s encouragement of a military coup 
against him (Phongpaichit/Baker 2008: 62, 81). 
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Thai Police and carving out a large swathe of influence across the armed forces. 
Moreover, as a telecommunications tycoon, Thaksin was in many ways a modern-day 
oligarch, whose economic empire could challenge that of the state, and whose economic 
clout could almost compete with that of the royal family. However, his sway was not only 
felt across the security sector. In the executive, legislative and judicial branches, Thaksin’s 
influence was clearly growing. 
By 2005, Thailand’s society and security sector was deeply divided over Thaksin. 
Thaksin’s social policies – a form of welfare capitalism – were unprecedented and 
extremely popular with Thailand’s impoverished majority. The popularity of these 
policies helped to create a voting constituency which handed Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai 
Party another landslide election in 2005. Late 2005 saw thousands of anti-Thaksin 
protestors begin to demonstrate across Bangkok. In early 2006, a group of them even met 
with Army Commander Sonthi, seeking his backing for a coup (Pathmanand 2008: 132). 
Simultaneously, relevant political parties (aside from Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai) refused to 
participate in elections. Ultimately, intra-civilian fissures over the propriety of Thaksin’s 
continued rule provided cover and legitimacy for elites to direct his overthrow.  
The Prime Minister eventually lost support from the palace. After his 2001 landslide 
election victory, the palace appeared angered when it sometimes seemed that Thaksin was 
seeking to steal the King’s spotlight. Thus it was argued that the “coup was nothing short 
of Thaksin versus the King” (McGeown 2006). Moreover, the palace apparently did not 
want Thaksin in power as the royal succession was drawing near (Handley 2006). A coup 
finally overthrew Thaksin on September 19, 2006. The putsch represented a victory for 
Privy Council Chair ret. Gen. Prem Tinsulanond as forces loyal to him seized power. 
Thaksin and Prem had vied for control over the military and influence with the palace 
since 2001. In addition to Prem, elements of the military had reason to depose Thaksin. 
First, as mentioned above, Thaksin exerted pressure to install his personal favorites in top 
military slots. Though his attempts had been less successful following an upswing in the 
southern insurgency in 2004, they continued. Second, Thaksin had diminished the size of 
the defense budget during his years as PM, a policy not popular with the military. Third, 
the Prime Minister had sought to privatize enterprises under the supervision of the Thai 
military (e.g. army-controlled channel five television station) (Rowley 2010). Fourth, at 
times, Thaksin had given the Royal Thai police more authority in areas traditionally 
reserved for the military (e.g. policy in the deep South) (Thayer 2007: 13). Fifth, senior 
military officers vehemently opposed Thaksin’s counter-insurgency policy in the far 
South (Pongsudhirak 2006). Sixth, given that anti-Thaksin military officers had become 
increasingly influential after 2004, the 2006 coup helped to alleviate fears among them 
that royalists would remain dominant even after the death of the elderly king and Prem 
(Pathmanand 2008: 130). Seventh, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratklin, an arch-
royalist with political ambitions, was personally swayed to lead the coup. In the end, a 
coup was indirectly authorized by Queen Sirikit and Prem while, in its aftermath, the king 
appeared relieved of its success (see Cable 1 2006; Cable 2 2007). 
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The military junta which toppled Thaksin held power until December 2007 elections, 
after which a newly-elected government assumed office in January, 2008. Yet democracy 
only returned following four alterations.  
Enactment of a military-endorsed constitution, which weakened political parties, 
facilitated the censuring of governments, gerrymandered the electoral system, and 
instituted a half-elected, half-appointed Senate.  
(1) Judicial decisions, including the 2008 conviction of Thaksin and the dissolution 
of his Thai Rak Thai party, compelling him to abandon direct participation in 
Thai politics.  
(2) Assertion of control over the armed forces by the arch-royalist “Eastern Tigers” 
(and “Queen’s Guards”) military faction as symbolized by Gen. Anupong 
Paochinda’s appointment as Army Commander in 2007.  
(3) Resurgence in influence for the Thai military back to levels approximating the 
pre-1992 period.  
Throughout most of 2008, a pro-Thaksin elected governing coalition held office. Yet by 
the end of that year, massive anti-Thaksin demonstrations, the refusal of the military to 
protect the government from the protestors, and court cases against the ruling party had 
taken their toll. In December, the Constitution Court forced the coalition from power 
and, with military help, an anti-Thaksin coalition assumed office (Rojanapruk 2008; 
Nanuam 2008). The new Democrat Party-led government held power for three years. 
During that time anti-government (and mostly pro-Thaksin) “Red Shirt” demonstrators 
held numerous protests. These culminated in a March-May 2010 mega-demonstration 
which was ultimately repressed by the army, leaving 93 dead. In August 2011, a pro-
Thaksin government led by his sister Yingluck was elected to office. As of 2013, it remains 
in power, though it has been able to exert little power over the armed forces, which 
themselves have become mostly insulated from civilian directives.  
4. Efforts at Security Sector Reform (1992-2006)  
The first real homegrown efforts at any modern sense of security sector reform commenced 
in 1992. By 1992, the rationale for a strong Thai military was beginning to fade. By 1991, the 
Cold War was over. In 1985 the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) had negotiated a final 
accord with the Thai government. Amidst these changes, the military found less and less 
reasons to maintain a national security state. Meanwhile, Thai civilians were growing in 
power and they wanted greater political involvement – including a more democratic 
constitution. The military’s repression of civilian demonstrators in May 1992 (Black May), 
caused its image in society to become severely tainted. As a result, civilians became 
increasingly united against armed forces power, the military itself became disunited, and 
more democratic and open security sector reforms suddenly became possible. 
Such factors allowed for a Thai government to push for security sector reform. After 
Black May, Prime Ministers Anand Panyarachun (1992); Chuan Leekpai (1992-1995; 
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1998-2001) gave SSR a high priority. Army Commander Gen. Wimol Wongwanich 
(1992-1995) offered lukewarm support for these reforms while Army Commander 
Surayudh Chulanond (1998-2002) was more steadfast in pushing them. Surayud in 
particular commenced a broad-based security sector reform which included the military‘s 
downsizing, streamlining and prosecution of allegedly corrupt officers. Such efforts did 
bear some fruit. In other ways, however, they were insufficient and ultimately unsuccess-
ful. In the end, they proved to be limited and largely symbolic. Telecommunications 
tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra‘s 2001 landslide electoral victory not only changed Thailand‘s 
political landscape but marked a sea change in civil-military relations. The new Prime 
Minister began to craft his own set of military allies as a means to build his own clique 
within the armed forces and expand his personalist influence across Thailand‘s security 
sector. His changes continued until the military ousted him in 2006. 
The security sector reforms implemented from 1992 until 2006 included changes 
involving specific areas of decision-making over which elected civilians have increasingly 
clashed with military bureaucrats. These areas were the dimensions of elite recruitment 
(the extent which the military controls political leadership), military organization, 
budgeting and control over security policy. Changes in these areas are examined below.  
Elite Recruitment 
First, after 1992, the military seemed to step back from the political stage. The King 
pressured military Prime Minister Suchinda to resign and appointed Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun as his caretaker successor. With the King’s support, Anand was able to dismiss 
three key army officers loyal to Suchinda from positions of power (Murray 1996: 190-194). 
Second, two army commanders during the 1990s (Gen. Wimol Wongwanich and Gen. 
Surayudh Chulanond) directed the military to undergo reforms and a restructuring. 
Actually, both Wimol and Surayud were close to Gen. Prem Tinsulanond, who was 
appointed to the Privy Council in 1988 and became its chair in 1998 (McCargo/ 
Pathmanand 2004: 133). Moreover, Chuan in his second term (1997-2001) took the post of 
Defense Minister as well as PM, pushing the military towards various reforms.  
In terms of reserved representation for soldiers, the 1992-2000 period saw a growth in 
political space for civilians (Bamrungsuk 2002: 77). In the Senate, the informal military 
reserved domain for military appointees diminished from 154 or 55.2% out of 270 
senators (1992-96) to 48 or 18.4% out of 260 (1996-2000) (Chambers 2009). The Prime 
Minister and members of the Lower House were by law required to be elected civilians. 
As for the Council of Ministers, the four governments between 1992 and 2000 allowed 
between two and eight cabinet positions (out of approximately 50 slots) to be held by ex-
military officials (Chambers 2009). 
Meanwhile, military interference in elections appeared to diminish during the mid-
1990s. However, at least in the 1996 general election, reports surfaced that armed forces 
personnel were involving themselves in elections. For example, Gen. Akradej Sasiprapa, 
in assisting the New Aspiration Party of his patron Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, 
threatened Democrat party vote canvassers while campaigning for New Aspiration 
candidates (Bangkok Post 1999, August 5). In a much more direct example of 
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manipulation, it was rumored that Privy Council Chair ret. Gen. Prem interfered in 
parliamentary politics on November 6, 1997 by influencing 12 members Prajakorn Thai 
party to defect from the ruling coalition and join the opposition, thus enabling the 
Democrat Party to form a coalition government (McCargo/Pathmanand 2005: 133).  
Regarding military veto power over the forming and dissolving of governments, this was 
not extant during the period at hand. There were no rules allowing such a military 
monopoly over elected governance. Nor were any instances in which the military informally 
took a tutelary role to either form governments or bring about their dissolution. 
Following enactment of the 1997 constitution, the security sector lost more power in 
the area of elite recruitment. That constitution established that henceforth senatorial 
candidates could only become part of that body through election. In the 2000-06 Senate, 
for the first time, all members (200) were elected. Meanwhile, only 2 per cent of these 
were retired military officers. Meanwhile the Senate which was elected in 2006 had no 
quota of retired military officers (Chambers 2009: 9). On January 6, 2001, 
telecommunications tycoon and ex-police colonel Thaksin Shinawatra, together with his 
political party Thai Rak Thai, won the general election by a landslide and he formed a 
coalition government which was to last an entire four-year term, something which had 
never occurred in Thailand. In February 2001, his government cobbled together a 40-
person cabinet. Other than Thaksin himself, only two retired security officials sat on the 
cabinet, former PM Gen. Chavalit Yongchiayudh (Minister of Defense) and his close 
associate Yuthasak Sasiprapha (Deputy Minister of Defense) (McCargo/Pathmanand 
2005: 134-135). Thaksin was re-elected by an even greater landslide in 2005, and he 
maintained the quota of two former military personnel other than himself. 
During this period, the armed forces possessed very little authority over procedures of 
political competition. Gone were the days when they could sit on the Senate or dominate 
the executive branch. Indeed, if anyone was manipulating the procedures of political 
competition it was Thaksin, the elected civilian. Thaksin’s clout in 2001 was such that he 
was able to exert overriding authority throughout parliament, courts, and even compete 
with Gen. Prem in terms of political influence. Thaksin saw to it that a great many top 
seats on the state monitoring agencies (e.g. Constitutional Court, Election Commission) 
were filled by his own loyalists. As for the military, Thaksin used a policy of appeasement. 
This he did by appointing 55 army generals to be advisors to the Prime Minister. 30 more 
were later added (McCargo/Pathmanand 2005: 151). At the same time, Thaksin used 
Chavalit and the latter’s close supporters to establish a wedge against Prem until the PM 
could maneuver his own cousin Chaisit Shinawatra in to the post of Army Chief 
(McCargo/Pathmanand 2005: 137). Ultimately, whatever power the military had over 
procedures of political competition derived from its association with Thaksin.  
As in the past, active duty military officers were generally forbidden to hold public 
office. Nor did the armed forces exert informal tutelage over Thaksin’s government. 
Thaksin’s success in co-opting Chavalit and other retired military officers into his Thai 
Rak Thai Party helped to ensure that none of them would informally score political points 
without some association with him. Meanwhile, Gen. Manoonkrit Rupkachorn, a Thaksin 
critic, served as Senator and Senate President.  
Unruly Boots: Military Power and Security Sector Reforms Efforts in Thailand 15
 
 
The military as an institution did not, during 2000-06 possess any veto power over 
forming and dissolving of governments. There were neither formal rules nor informal 
tutelary rights which allowed for armed forces’ breaches in civilian control during this time. 
Given the implementation of the 1997 constitution and the 2001-06 dominance of 
civilian strongman Thaksin across Thailand, civilian control of the military perhaps grew to 
its highest levels in Thai history. Thaksin made use of the new constitution which buttressed 
the powers of political parties and Prime Ministers against non-democratic forces. He also 
utilized his enormous financial resources to market himself or buy off potential enemies. 
His landslide electoral victories, enormous popularity among the masses, and ability to 
successfully joust against Gen. Prem allowed Thaksin to monopolize the political space once 
dominated by the armed forces and other political parties.  
Organization  
Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s armed forces was a large, non-transparent force which 
lacked proper training, equipment, and whose decision-making structure often lacked 
unity and ability to adequately coordinate. As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s, 
questions began to arise as to the future force size and structure of the armed forces. 
Policies aimed at downsizing the armed forces began during the Chatchai Choonhavan 
administration when Chatchai began balking at certain military weapons requests and 
reducing parts of Prem’s “national security state” (Handley 2008: 15). Even after the 1991 
coup, PM Anand Panyarachun announced that “military might is no longer a guarantee 
of national security”. In late November, the army proclaimed that it would cut its force 
levels by 25 percent in the next 10 years (Murray 1996: 10). Black May 1992 (which placed 
the military in disrepute) as well as the 1997 financial crisis added impetus to the drive 
towards a reordered and restructured military. These events forced the armed forces to 
reluctantly shift out of its preferred political role to a greater emphasis on restructuring 
and professionalism. The 1994 Defense White Paper stressed the military’s streamlined 
defense policy, including the following clause: 
Restructure the Armed Forces so that it is more compact and has professional personnel 
with modern weapons and equipment so that it can guarantee the independence, 
sovereignty, and national interests of the nation (Ministry of Defense 1994: 58). 
The trend of such professional commitments continued through the 1990s. Indeed, the 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government (1996-7) initiated proposals aimed at restructuring 
the armed forces and improving public oversight of the military. The incoming Chuan 
Leekpai government (1997-2001) took up these recommendations (through the Ministry 
of Defense or MOD) and, in October 1999, with the necessary cooperation of reformist 
Army Commander Surayud Chulanond, approved a plan to reform the MOD and 
restructure the military. The goal was to build a smaller, credible, professional, more 
efficient, more capable, and more transparent armed forces over the following 10 years 
(Bangkok Post 1999, November 19). There was also to be a “reallocation of military 
spending from personnel to procurement and training” (Hänggi 2009: 11). Ultimately, the 
military downsizing involved transforming the armed forces which had become top-
heavy in terms of excess high-ranking officers by encouraging early retirements by many 
of these officials. The entire downsizing plan involved a total reduction of 72,000 
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personnel posts as well as a more unified structural command among the three services 
(army, navy, air force), the Defense Permanent Secretary, and the Supreme Command to 
improve coordination and facilitate control from the Office of the Prime Minister. Yet the 
plan was hindered by disagreements over whether the Defense Permanent Secretary or 
the Supreme Commander should have more authority. The advent of the Thaksin 
administration temporarily put the reforms on hold. From 2002 to 2004, the reforms were 
reviewed but the political crisis (beginning in 2005) prevented the government from 
seriously taking up the armed forces reform. As such, the aforementioned reforms appear 
to have been put on ice in all but name. The 2006 coup – and heightened role of the 
military in Thai politics today – could mean that any military restructuring will have to 
come through the initiative of the military itself. 
Budgeting 
In the aftermath of the 1992 Black May massacre, the military under Army Commander 
Gen. Wimol Wongwanich, facing massive negative perceptions by the public, media, and 
parliament, reluctantly agreed to a defense budget reduction for fiscal year 1993-94. The 
general mid-1990s decline in military appropriations continued, owing partly to the 1997 
Asian financial crisis as well as to the growing supremacy of “civilianization” in Thai 
politics: the “people’s” constitution was adopted in 1997.4 Stated bluntly, the 1997 
financial crisis gave the military less of a reason to compete for a higher budget given the 
country’s economic hard times. At the same time, parliamentary scrutiny of military 
appropriations now grew even more intense and the result was a decline in armed forces 
funding. This loss in revenue led many soldiers to increasingly expand their commercial 
interests as well as rely on sometimes-shady business activities (Hänggi 2009: 10-11). To 
rein in illegal military activities and limit armed forces economic autonomy, Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai and then-Army Commander Surayudh Chulanond, ordered 
crackdowns military-related “narcotics trafficking, extortion rackets, illegal bookmaking, 
unsecured loans from Thai Military Bank, and corruption in the conscription process” 
(Ockey 201: 201). The Chuan government also sought to centralize weapons procurement, 
in order to establish greater government control over armed forces funding. But confronted 
with intense military resistance, this proposal was eventually shelved (McCargo/ 
Pathmanand 2005: 132). 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06) established a new method for gaining 
control of military spending: personalizing control over the military. This he did by 
ensuring that military allocation requests would have to pass through himself 
(McCargo/Pathmanand 2005: 137). This he did in four ways. First, he drew former PM 
Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh closer to his Thai Rak Thai party (Chavalit’s New Aspiration 
Party merged with TRT in 2002). Chavalit was made Defense Minister. Second, Chavalit’s 
close aide Gen. Yuthasak Sasiprapha was elevated to the post of Deputy Minister of 
Defense. Third, Yuthasak’s brother-in-law Gen. Somdhat Attanand was made Army 
 
 
4  In 1997 the Thai defense budget was reduced by 25 percent, the highest decline in years. See Bureau of the 
Budget, Office of the Prime Minister (Thailand) for statistics. 
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Commander. Somdhat was close to Thai Rak Thai and cooperated with Thaksin. Fourth, 
the PM elevated Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School Class 10 graduates (former 
classmates of Thaksin) to various military positions. Finally, he saw to it that his cousin 
Gen. Chaisit Shinawatra was made Army Commander in 2002. In this way, Thaksin was 
at last able to guarantee that he would personally control the Thai military budget. From 
2001 to 2006, it declined by 0.4 percent of the GDP (see table below) as the government 
transferred greater moneys into alternative budget projects. Ultimately, under Thaksin, 
civilian control stood at its greatest apex over military spending. Yet this form of civilian 
control was personalized, rather than institutionalized. As such, Thaksin the civilian 
could act arbitrarily, as a mafia boss over his fief. 
Security Policy 
The military has traditionally dominated most aspects of security policy, including border 
and foreign policy. During the 1990s, border policy continued to be a bastion of control 
for soldiers and generally remains so to this day. Foreign policy, on the other hand, came 
to be dominated by civilians. Moreover, in 1998, seven years since the end of the Cold 
War, a year after the 1997 financial crisis and amidst efforts to restructure the armed 
forces, Prime Minister Chuan and then-Army Commander Surayud attempted to reshape 
military objectives. They thus added a new role for the military in Thai foreign policy: 
participation in United Nations peace-keeping missions. Such missions would keep the 
army busy in the post-Cold War environment and perhaps provide it with income. As 
such, the Chuan government “donated” troops for use by the United Nations (UN), in the 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), from 1999 to 2002 (UNTAET website). 
The Thai military also participated in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (2001-2002), 
and the Multinational force in Iraq (MNF-I), offering 423 personnel from 2003 to 2004. 
The armed forces moreover continued to work in rural development projects. By the early 
2000s, the military appeared to have become more professional, apolitical, and a force for 
peace. Still, in terms of foreign and border policy the armed forces continued to follow its 
own policy, playing a crucial though slightly reduced role in relations with Cambodia, 
Laos, and Burma because of shared boundaries (Ockey 2001: 203). 
The 2001-2006 Thaksin government represented the nadir of military influence over 
Thai public policy. Perhaps the only occasion where the military successfully influenced 
Thaksin involved the decision by the Thai government in October 2001 to reverse itself 
and give full support to the US against Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11.5 Under 
Thaksin, foreign policy became more closely aligned with the United States. Indeed, 
elements of the Thai military were sent in support of US forces in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Though the Thai armed forces took a back seat to Thaksin during this time, they 
generally supported the PM’s pro-US tilt. 
At the same time, since the 1990s, the National Security Council (NSC) has come to 
represent an uncommon area where civilians have managed to exert more control than 
 
 
5  See Chambers 2004: US-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?, in: Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 26: 3, 460-479. 
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military officers. Given that only two NSC members are active duty soldiers (the NSC 
Secretary-General and the Supreme Commander (now called the Chief of Defense 
Forces)), the prime minister has been able to dominate “the workings of the council” 
(Ministry of Defense (Thailand) website). 
5. The Post-2006 Balance of Power between the Security and 
Civilian Sector 
The September 19, 2006 military putsch against Thaksin put an end to most security 
sector reforms linked with democratic governance. Moreover, since 2006, the balance of 
decision-making power between the security (particularly the military) and civilian 
sectors has shifted decidedly in favor of the former. This increase in the authority of the 
security sector has been both formal (enshrined powers) and informal (unwritten 
authority), cutting across certain decision-making areas from among the dimensions of 
elite recruitment (leadership selection), public policy, national defense, internal security 
and military organization (Croissant/Kuehn 2010: 959-975).  
First, in the area of elite recruitment, where before the coup, the Senate was entirely 
elected, it was now half-appointed. And indeed, among the appointed Senators in the 150-
member Upper House, Thailand’s military was allowed to nominate a certain portion of 
them (appointed senators were to have 3-year terms). As a result, in the post-2008 Senate, 
among the 74 appointed Senators, 14 were ex-soldiers for a 9.3% military reserved domain. 
In 2011, the number of appointed Senators who were retired security officials grew to 16 out 
of 150 or 10.6%.6 Most of the Senators selected in 2011, called “demon babies” by the pro-
Thaksin Puea Thai party, had links to the forces behind the 2006 coup (Butrsripoom et al. 
2011).  
There have also been attempts by the armed forces to shape the ascension of civilian 
governments by both influencing electoral outcomes as well as coalition formation. Just 
before the 2007 and 2011 elections, the military was accused of backing and financially 
assisting parties opposed to pro-Thaksin parties, with the Army Commander and Defense 
Minister allegedly directing soldiers to support certain parties aligned against Thaksin.7 
Meanwhile, prior to the 2011 election, Task Force 315 (of the Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC)) was allegedly formed to monitor Red Shirts and sway 
votes against Puea Thai – allegations which the military denied (The Nation 2011, May 
30). Meanwhile, ISOC officials traveled the Northeast – heart of the Red Shirts – in weeks 
prior to the election, championing the works of King Bhumipol, with the implication that 
northeastern voters should choose electoral candidates with proven loyalty to the crown – 
something which Thaksin was deemed not to possess (O’Brien 2011).  
 
 
6 Author's calculations, based upon: Senate, Thailand, Elected Senators 2008, www.senate.go.th/th_senate/ 
English/members_biodata.pdf (3.7.2013). 
7 See Nanuam 2009; Nanuam 2007; Thiewsangan 2011; Bangkok Post 2011, July 15. 
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Alleged election-tampering aside, senior brass had even helped to form governments. 
On December 2, 2008, following the resignation of a pro-Thaksin Prime Minister, military 
elements (including the Army Commander) met with a Democrat party bigwig and an ex-
loyalist of Thaksin to cobble together a coalition government under Democrat Abhisit 
Vechachiwa which would exclude the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai party (Nanuam 2008; 
Rojanaphruk 2008). There were even allegations that the army had financed the defections 
of politicians from the pro-Thaksin ruling coalition to the opposition (Cable 3 2008). This 
oblique intrusion into civilian political competition indicated that despite the return to 
ostensible civilian rule in 2008, the military would continue to play a pivotal role.  
THAI PROTEST GROUPS 
In 2013 Thailand, there are several protest groups which either oppose or support Thaksin 
Shinawatra. These are listed in order of their chronological establishment: 
(1) People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD): Formed in late 2005, this ironic alliance of civil 
libertarians and royalists opposed the Thaksin government (2005-2006), and two successor 
pro-Thaksin governments (2008). After several occupations and demonstrations, it helped 
to bring down the pro-Thaksin government in late 2008. It has received sympathy or 
support from the military and the palace. Pro-PAD election candidates ran in the 2011 
election under the umbrella of the PAD-created New Politics Party 
(www.antithaksin.com/SiteMap.php, 11.6.2013).  
(2) United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD): Formed in 2006, the members of 
this well-coordinated protest group generally belong to the rural, lower classes and, in 
terms of policy, they support greater state attention to the problems of the poor. The UDD 
has generally supported Thaksin Shinawatra and it is allied with the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai 
party (http://thairedshirts.org/, 11.6.2013). 
(2a) Red Siam: Formed in 2009, this faction within the UDD supports a republic with a more 
socialistic form of government and economic system.  
(3) Thai Patriots Network: Formed in 2009, this splinter of the PAD is focused upon issues 
concerning threats by foreigners to Thai borders, especially with regard to the Preah Vihear 
temple and border policy by pro-Thaksin governments. Two of its leading members have 
been jailed in Cambodia for trespassing. 
(4) Network of Citizen Volunteers Protecting the Land (Multicolored Shirts): Formed in 2010, 
this small protest group is opposed to all aspects of the UDD. Its leader is Dr. Tul 
Sithisomwong, a member of the Bangkok upper class. 
(5) Green Politics Group: Formed in 2011, this pressure group leans towards the PAD but has 
also sought negotiations with the pro-Thaksin Phuea Thai Party. 
(6) Siam Rescue: Formed in 2012, this small, virulently anti-Thaksin group has called for a 
military coup against the Yingluck government, is closely connected to army leaders, but 
has had only mild turnout at its demonstrations. 
New Politics Party Secretary-General Suriyasai Katasila has unveiled the newly-formed Green Politics 
group, which will work in parallel with the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) on scrutinizing 
the Government’s work. 
Mr. Suriyasai announced that he had established the Green Politics group with an aim to spearhead 
political movements of the civil sector and coordinate with the PAD on probing the Pheu Thai-led 
government’s operations. Initially, the group plans to seek talks with the Government to demand that 
it refrains from giving amnesty to ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra, plotting against the monarchy and 
amending the Constitution. 
The Green Politics coordinator also insisted that the Government should show its sincerity by halting 
the red-shirt group from causing more social disturbances and intervening in the media. He 
recommended that lessons from the past be learned and the current opportunity be used for 
correcting previous mistakes. 
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As for internal security, a new military-endorsed Internal Security Act (ISA) took 
effect in 2008. It shifted the civil-military equilibrium back towards the armed forces, 
establishing the army as the principal unit safeguarding internal security (Ministry of 
Defense 2008: 35). The ISA revised the structure of the Internal Security Operations 
Command (ISOC) so that, though the Prime Minister was Director, military/military-
leaning bureaucrats outnumbered civilian members on the ISOC board. Moreover, under 
this board, there are four regional branches of ISOC commanded by military officers who 
are not accountable to civilians (Internal Security Act, Study 1, Section 11). Many are 
concerned that by establishing the army chief as ISOC deputy director and regional 
commanders as regional ISOC heads, this “would place the military at the heart of a 
future civilian government at all levels” (Human Rights Watch 2007). 
In 2008, Army Commander Anupong refused to offer security to two pro-Thaksin 
governments (e.g. Samak, Somchai). Moreover, in late October, as Yellow Shirt protests in 
Bangkok continued unabated, Army Chief Anupong went on national television to call 
for the resignation of Somchai or dissolution of the Lower House although the PM 
refused to do so (The Nation 2008, October 17). 
Such behavior demonstrated a military refusal to maintain internal security for elected 
governments in Thailand. Yet, following the ascension to power of an anti-Thaksin 
civilian government at the end of 2008, the “Eastern Tigers”-dominated military now 
found a need to ensure its protection and survival. Thereupon, Anupong’s ISOC moved 
from evading responsibility for internal security to guaranteeing it (The Nation 2009, 
March 25). 
During March-May 2010, when the pro-Thaksin “Red Shirts” occupied parts of 
Bangkok, the military applied another law called the “Emergency Decree on Government 
Administration in States of Emergency” of 2005 (Szep/Petty 2010). The Emergency 
Decree law is more draconian than the ISA and gives the military even greater autonomy 
from civilian control (ICJ 2010: 4). 
Turning to public policy, in border policy, the post-2007 military has become more 
autonomous of civilian authorities, as exemplified by the fact that the military has refused 
to go along with 1) diplomatic negotiations to resolve a boundary dispute with Cambodia; 
and 2) a decision by the government to allow China to lead patrols in parts of the Mekong 
River bordering Thailand (Bangkok Post 2011, December 1). Meanwhile, in terms of 
policy relating to the media, the armed forces continue to exert much control over 
telecommunications. Currently the army controls television channels 5 and 7 and 245 out 
of 524 radio stations in 2008 (United States State Department 2011). A Broadcasting Act 
was implemented which continued to grant broadcasting concessions to military vested 
interests (Noi 2009). 
Only the National Security Council has continued to be dominated by civilians. Since 
the return to democracy in Thailand in early 2008, there have been far more civilian NSC 
members than active duty security officials. This has occurred despite the fact that there 
have been many more security officers acting as NSC secretary generals. In July 2009, 
civilian power vis-à-vis the NSC increased even more with PM Abhisit Vechachiwa’s 
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appointment of Thawil Pliensri as NSC Secretary-General. This occurred despite intense 
lobbying by Army Commander Anupong Paochinda for a replacement with an army 
background. In 2011, under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, security officials 
returned to act lead the NSC. By 2013, the NSC had had 16 secretary-generals, with only 
three of them civilians (Nanuam, Bangkok Post 2009, July 2). Nevertheless, its board 
members were dominated by civilians. Nevertheless, the Council continues to be 
dominated by civilians. In 2013, the NSC is leading efforts to negotiate with Malay-
Muslim insurgents in Thailand’s deep South (Bangkok Post 2013, February 16).  
Finally, regarding military organization, in 2008 a new law was promulgated which 
requires that reshuffles of high-ranking officers (the rank of brigadier general and higher) 
be vetted by a committee, whose members include the army commander, navy 
commander, air force commander, supreme commander, and permanent defense 
secretary (a military official) as well as the civilian defense minister and (optionally) 
deputy defense minister. Previously, the defense and prime minister had the ultimate say 
on appointments (though these were to be endorsed by the king). In future, if any dispute 
occurs as to an appointment, a simple committee vote settles the dispute given that 
unelected military members of the committee account for five votes as opposed to two for 
civilians, the new arrangement should heighten military prowess at the expense of the 
authority of civilians with regard to reshuffles (OMD 2008).  
As for budgeting, the military has increasingly had its way. The 2007 constitution 
included a new charter clause (Section 77) which required the state to provide the armed 
forces with a sufficient (though unspecified) amount of money to guarantee national 
security. Since 2007, the military has managed to informally pressure civilian 
governments for continued increases in defense allocations. Indeed, the defense budget 
rose from US$3.3 billion in 2007 to US$5.6 in 2011 (2007-2010 derived from IISS 2011; 
2011 data derived from Moss 2011).  
Finally, accountability within Thailand’s security sector as an organization is 
insufficient and there is evidence of corruption. The army has a secret budget which is not 
monitored by outsiders. Also, according to Transparency International, “There is also 
evidence of illicit private enterprise by individual military men in industries such as Thai 
boxing [while] whistle-blowing” about corruption is hindered by the Military Personnel 
Act of 1933, which discourages “disunity” in the armed forces (TI 2012). Ultimately, 
Transparency International lists Thailand as a country “with inadequate safeguards 
against graft in defence and weapons deals” (TI 2013). 
6. Current State of Civilian Control 
Civilian control today is weak while military prerogatives, privileges and autonomy from 
civilian oversight are robust. Civilians who are concerned with potential threats from the 
military generally comprise elected politicians and the civilians they appoint. It is 
interesting that in an emerging democracy such as Thailand where coups have been 
common, there has been little civil society participation in seeking local ownership over 
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security sector reforms. However, Thailand’s history of highly-verticalized political power 
and frail democracy has prevented the emergence of a strong civil society which 
prioritizes elected civilian control as a major objective. Though civilian protestors (mostly 
university students) have sometimes protested against the army, such demonstrations 
have been occasional. Only the UDD Red Shirts – which are partisan in support of 
Thaksin Shinawatra – have protested against the military given that they view senior 
military leaders as opposed to Thaksin. 
Ultimately then, civil-military relations today involve dealings between 
institutionalized civilian leaders and leading military officers. With the senior brass 
ostensibly taking orders from these elected civilian leaders, the apparent hierarchy 
conceals a limit to armed forces subservience. After all, the military serves the palace, not 
the Prime Minister with elected civilian leaders being temporarily tolerated. “A 
government supervises soldiers but the real owners are the country and the King” (Privy 
Council Chair ret. Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, quoted in Sutichai 2006).  
After the military’s 2008 “silent coup”, two large-scale, pro-Thaksin “Red Shirt” 
demonstrations occupied parts of Bangkok (April 2009; March-May 2010) in attempts at 
disrupting the administration of the Democrat-led government. Especially in the second 
case, the protestors’ goal was to force new elections but such re-democratization efforts 
failed when the army repressed the demonstrations, leaving scores of protestors dead 
(Horn 2011). 
Since 2011, the newly-elected Puea Thai government of Yingluck Shinawatra has 
pushed for greater civilian control over the military but so far with little success. A pro-
Thaksin retired general was appointed Defense Minister while others became informal 
defense advisors (Bangkok Post 2011, December 1). Nevertheless, in the October 2011 
annual military reshuffle, the senior military appointments vetting board gave the service 
leaders a voting advantage over the two representatives representing Yingluck, and the 
government was unable to veto the nominees of the “Eastern Tigers”-dominated military. 
In the end, only the Defense Permanent Secretary position went to an officer favored by 
Puea Thai (Cole/Sciaccitano 2011).  
Though Puea Thai has threatened to amend the Defense Administration Act to scrap 
the vetting committee, this will not be easy. Indeed, any amendment passed by the Lower 
House must also be approved by the Senate. Yet the Upper House – with its seats half-
filled with appointed Senators (including a quota chosen by the armed forces) might 
refuse to pass the bill (Komchadleuk 2012). In another blow to Yingluck, Thailand’s 
Council of State, in September 2011, refused to allow anyone except the Prime Minister to 
act as Director of ISOC. Yingluck had sought to have a pro-Thaksin retired military 
advisor act as director (Bangkok Post 2011, November 20). Meanwhile, the Puea Thai 
government has increasingly used police (considered to be more pro-Thaksin), rather 
than the military, for security objectives. Indeed police are playing an enhanced role in 
this government’s southern counter-insurgency policy (The Nation 2011, September 23). 
Moreover, a new board of eleven commissioners assumed office at the National 
Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission, six of whom were persons with 
military or police backgrounds and aligned with Yingluck (Chetchotiros 2011). 
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Meanwhile, civilian groups bent on maintaining or promoting democratic space have 
generally continued to persevere. Anti-Thaksin civil society groups (e.g. Yellow Shirts; 
Multi-Colored Shirts) as well as the Democrat Party are spearheading any efforts by the 
government against a re-imposition of Thaksin’s populist authoritarianism and a state-
proposed royal pardon for Thaksin (currently a fugitive) (Bangkok Post 2011, November 
20). More pertinent to this study, the Red Shirts and prominent Puea Thai party members 
have sought to pressure Yingluck to prosecute military officials responsible for the May 
2010 repression and also amend the 2008 Defense Act so that the Prime Minister can 
exert more control over senior military reshuffles (Nanuam/Laohong 2012; Bangkok 
Pundit 2011). Yet at this point in time, there is little evidence that any civil society group 
will succeed in diluting Thai military clout in the near future, especially with soldiers 
continuing to receive enormous patronage from the palace.  
7. International Contributions to Security Sector Reform  
Security sector modification in Thailand has always been a domestic-led process using 
insights, advice and assistance from other countries. This owes to three factors. First, Thai 
elites, exuding a nationalistic pride given that Thailand was never colonized, have always 
wanted to maintain “ownership” over any security sector reforms. Second, military elites 
generally do not want to be placed under elected civilian control. Third, as mentioned 
above, there has been a long-entrenched suspicion among Thais of “otherness” – or 
perceptions of foreign encroachment – upon Thailand’s heavily guarded symbol of unity 
– Buddhist kingship. Such a perception has generated a suspicion among Thais of any 
attempt by foreigners to meddle with the king, loyal Thai subjects to the king, and the 
kingdom itself. Despite such suspicions, though Thais have been fearful of external 
interference in their affairs, they have welcomed external aid. Indeed, the evolution of 
Thailand’s security sector – as a domestic-led phenomenon with assistance from abroad – 
can be seen throughout Thai history. In the late 1800s, Siam’s absolute monarchy 
established a permanent standing army and police force, modeling them on England’s 
security sector and using advisors and trainers from mostly England and Italy. After the 
1932 overthrow of absolute monarchy, Thailand’s security sector became influenced by 
France. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, as Thailand aligned itself with fascist 
Germany and Japan, there was a reconfiguration in security sector organization which 
mirrored structures in these countries. Finally, since 1946, Thailand’s security sector has 
reflected administrative and institutional methods akin to the United States 
(Bumroongsook 1991: 264-265). Moreover, from 1951 until the late 1990s, the US was 
Thailand’s aid patron. As such, the United States, more than any other foreign entity, has 
been most capable of affecting security sector reform in Thailand. Yet if this was truly a 
US objective, Washington clearly failed in achieving it. 
Today the United States is the principal supplier for Thailand’s security sector though 
the country is increasingly diversifying its weapons acquisitions, trainings and other 
military assistance towards China, Sweden and other countries. Nevertheless Washington 
has been and remains quite influential with the country’s armed forces. In light of the 
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United States’ long cooperation with Thailand in providing assistance to the country’s 
security sector, to what extent has the United States sought to shape Thai security sector 
reform? This section addresses this question. 
Perhaps the most important US program in Thailand relating to security sector reform 
has been the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET is a 
relatively low-cost program which provides funding for US trainings of foreign military 
personnel. IMET’s objectives are: 
Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military to 
military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation 
between the United States and foreign countries; provide training that augments the 
capabilities of participant nations’ military forces to support combined operations and 
interoperability with US forces; and increase the ability of foreign military and civilian 
personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally 
recognized human rights in their own government and military (US State Department). 
The trainings are partly meant to expose students to US-approved notions of military 
professionalism and civilian control over the military. The program introduces 
participants to “institutions and elements of U.S. democracy such as the judicial system, 
legislative oversight, free speech, equality issues, and commitment to human rights” 
(United States State Department). 
The Expanded IMET (a subset of IMET) particularly focuses upon civilian control of 
the military by exposing students to American military justice systems and by 
highlighting how in the US the military works with civilian bureaucrats and legislators. 
Yet another part of IMET, the US Field Studies Program, exposes students to American 
civic culture: the importance of democratic values, human rights, and belief in rule of law 
(United States State Department (1)). 
Since 1952, thousands of Thai military officers have received such training, though it 
was only formalized as IMET in 1976. Many of these Thai officers, such as current Privy 
Council Chair (ret. Gen.) Prem Tinsulanonda, have attained top military and civilian 
leadership positions. It is disconcerting that former IMET students (such as Prem) either 
engineered or supported coups against elected governments. Indeed, 7 out of 13 leading 
army officers when the 1991-1992 military junta was in power (including Army 
Commander Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon himself) received IMET training in the United 
States (Taw 1994: 26). Senior military officials who were part of the 2006-2008 military 
junta (e.g. Gen. Boonsrang Niumpradit) also studied in the United States through IMET. 
Ultimately, a large percentage of Thai army, navy, air force, supreme command and 
defense ministry officials have been trained in the United States. Despite the fact that 
IMET trainings have focused upon issues such as civilian control over the military, several 
of these Thai officers went on to participate in or lead military coups against elected Thai 
governments. Another disconcerting fact about IMET is that Thailand receives a 
relatively high amount of IMET funding (in comparison to other countries), and yet 
Thailand arguably has been and remains one of the most coup-prone countries in the 
world. Indeed, it is interesting that Thailand, with over 20 coups since 1932, has received 
Unruly Boots: Military Power and Security Sector Reforms Efforts in Thailand 25
 
 
over US$1 million in IMET appropriations per year (2008-2011). What is curious is that 
the US granted Thailand an even higher amount (US$2.3 million) in IMET funding in 
2006 – the very year of the last coup (see Table 1). The putsch resulted in a cancellation of 
US IMET aid until the return to democracy in early 2008. When elected governance did 
return, however, the military had heightened powers than before the 2006 coup. 
Surprisingly, US IMET aid had now been cut in half. The increased military sway in 
Thailand does not seem to justify such vastly decreased IMET funding. Moreover, the US 
IMET program receives fewer appropriations in comparison to most other disbursements 
to Thailand, a fact which reveals the relative hypocrisy in US IMET financing. 
Annual IMET Disbursement 2006-2011 (figures in millions of US$) 
2006 
Actual 
2007 
Actual 
2008 
Actual 
2009 
Actual 
2010 
Estimate 
2011 
Requested 
2,369 No US aid 1,202 1,459 1,500 1,500 
Source: US State Department: International Military Education and Training Account Summary, 
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm (5.6.2013).  
 
All in all, IMET does not appear to have succeeded in politically socializing Thai military 
personnel to be enamored with principles of democracy and civilian control. However, 
Thai military officers do value the IMET trainings, seeing them as necessary for 
advancement to senior military postings and also perhaps mandatory in order to later 
gain access to US high-technology weapons systems (Taw 1994: 22). 
Meanwhile, among the objectives of US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Thailand 
are the following:  
(1) Improve the military capabilities of key friendly countries to contribute to 
international crisis response operations, including peacekeeping and 
humanitarian crises. 
(2) Maintain support for democratically-elected governments that share values 
similar to the United States for democracy, human rights, and regional stability 
(United States Department of State (2)). 
These goals sound lofty indeed. One wonders how Washington has sufficient levers 
within FMF to ensure that militaries remain geared towards “peacekeeping”, being 
“humanitarian” or supporting democracy and human rights. Washington has helped 
Bangkok to decrease the size of Thai defense spending: during the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, when Bangkok was looking to make defense cuts, the US released Thailand from an 
earlier contract to buy F-18 warplanes (Beeson/Bellamy 2008: 114). The US has also 
cancelled FNF aid to Thailand twice: shortly after the 1991 and 2006 coups until elections 
were again held. Beginning principally under Thaksin Shinawatra, however, Thailand 
sought to diversify its weapons acquisitions. Indeed, it has purchased arms from Sweden, 
and China, among other countries. In 2006, following Washington’s legally mandated 
cancellation of $24 million in US military assistance, the Chinese offered $49 million in 
military assistance, offered to increase the number of Thai exchange students at Chinese 
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military schools, and increased joint special forces exercises (Lohman 2011). Eventually, 
though American FMF resumed in 2008, Washington is now facing steep competition 
from China, which offers no conditions for its aid. Nevertheless, many Thai military 
officers view Chinese security supplies as inferior to that of the US and the European 
Union. Regardless, as alternatives to US military hardware continue to open up, FMF may 
become an even weaker tool if the US is seeking to use it to promote security sector 
reform in Thailand. 
All in all, United States security sector programs in Thailand have generally proved 
useless in promoting a form of security sector reform in Thailand which is geared towards 
greater democratic governance. This failure owes first to what was mentioned at the 
beginning of this section: security sector reform in Thailand has been a domestic-led 
process. Elites are not willing to be led towards SSR by foreigners. Second, despite US 
rhetoric in favor of security sector reforms and moves towards civilian control over the 
military, other US goals more often than not compromised SSR. For example, though IMET 
sought to inculcate Thai soldiers to appreciate democracy, during the Cold War 
Washington tended to give greater relevance to trainings in countering Communist 
insurgency. Third, any foreign-directed SSR has tended to be heavily impeded given that 
international stakeholders, who tend to interpret SSR as a method of moving towards 
greater democratic governance, must grapple with the fact that in Thailand, monarchy 
remains above and unhindered by any form of democracy. Fourth, the United States and 
other countries which might want to push for SSR in Thailand are today confronted with 
acrimonious political polarization among Thais. To support a more democratic security 
sector means greater support for Thaksin Shinawatra and his forces given that Thaksin and 
his allies have won every national election since 2001. Moreover, efforts at SSR which would 
make the security sector less answerable to a nonelected monarch readily fall on deaf ears in 
Thailand, a country which reveres its king. For the United States and other countries which 
criticized the 2006 coup and Thailand’s laws which punish people who are convicted of 
insulting the Thai king, any efforts at successfully affecting moves towards security sector 
reform in Thailand will be difficult indeed. What is more likely is that Thailand’s armed 
forces and police will continue taking as many weapons, trainings and assistance from the 
security relationship with Western countries as they can, without becoming inculcated into 
any US or European form of “democratic” security sector reform. At the same time, 
Thailand will continue to diversify military assistance in favor of China.  
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8. Conclusion: What Can Be Done 
Security sector reform seeks to help countries better satisfy security needs “within their 
societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of 
governance and the rule of law” (OECD DAC 2007). Civilian control, meanwhile, “is a 
relative condition”, in which civilian supremacy can be “strong”, “weak”, “encompassing” 
or “limited” (Croissant/Kuehn 2010: 27). This report has discussed the obstacles to 
civilian control as well as the weak efforts of security sector reform in Thailand which, 
especially after 2006, proved unsustainable. It highlights the major political role played by 
the armed forces since 1887 and especially since 1932, after which senior military 
commanders either monopolized power themselves or held enormous count in a power 
partnership with the king. During the time in which democracies have existed in 
Thailand, democratic civilian control has been relatively frail with militaries more often 
than not succeeding in wresting control over decision-making areas which might be 
assumed to be under the control of civilians. 
In addition, the existence of several generally non-transparent security bureaucracies 
has made security sector reform an even more difficult process to accomplish. The armed 
forces headquarters, the army, navy, air force, police and paramilitaries often possess 
overlapping jurisdictions, have been mired in cases of opaque corruption and most 
security officials have become ensconced in the national political split relating to ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.  
The security sector finds rationales to continue its high profile role in Thailand. These 
are engaging in counter-insurgency in Thailand’s deep South; guarding boundaries which 
Thailand shares with Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand; and preserving order in the 
midst of potential threats by Thaksin and his followers to the constitutional monarchy. 
For a short time (1992-2001) Thailand’s civilian and military elite embarked on a 
security sector reform which diminished the defense budget, scaled down the size of the 
armed forces, and sought to place the military increasingly under the control of the elected 
Prime Minister. These reforms were meant to institutionalize civilian supremacy in 
Thailand. Yet they met much opposition among security bureaucrats and were never fully 
implemented. Then, during the 2001-2006 administration of Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, civilian control finally did begin to take root. However such control was 
personalized under Thaksin himself. Since the 2006 coup, enactment of the 2007 
constitution, and return to civilian rule in early 2008, Thailand’s security sector (particularly 
the armed forces) have enhanced their powers vis-a-vis the elected government. To some 
extent, Thaksin has succeeded in influencing much of the Royal Thai Police. 
Regardless, since 2006, an arch-royalist military has succeeded in remaining insulated 
from control by Thaksin or elected civilians. At the same time, though the police have 
tended to back Thaksin, they must remain loyal to the king. As a result, Thaksin and his 
forces in 2013 have managed to control only the Lower House of parliament and the 
ruling cabinet (the members of which are chosen by the leading party). Yet the armed 
forces (and theoretically the police as well) are beholden to the king – a nondemocratic 
yet beloved figure for Thai people. 
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International efforts at security sector reform have been miniscule and perhaps even 
half-hearted. The longest lasting one – the IMET program of the United States – has proven 
itself to be ineffective especially since many Thai officers participating in IMET (to inculcate 
values of civilian control) later went on to lead or participate in military coups. 
Security sector reform will not come to Thailand until greater democracy comes to 
Thailand. The security sector needs to be accountable to democratically-elected 
politicians rather than the palace alone. As such, there must be a fully-elected Senate in 
which military appointees are unable to sit in the Upper House. At the same time, the 
armed forces and police must be shorn of their economic holdings and military/police 
budgets must be made much more transparent so that defense/police appropriations do 
not wind up being used for partisan purposes. Moreover, border and other related 
security objectives must not be under jurisdiction of the military alone. Civilian 
authorities must be able to exercise control over armed forces activities. In terms of senior 
military reshuffles, these should be decided by the Prime Minister and Defense Minister, 
rather than by a board of officials, the majority of which are active duty military officers. 
Furthermore, media and censuring should not be under the control of armed forces 
personnel but rather monitored only by civilian agencies. Finally military and police 
corruption – made easy by the secrecy within the security sector – can best be resolved by 
having civilian agencies conduct regular audits of military accounts. Such security sector 
deficiencies in Thailand point to the need for some form of urgent security sector reform. 
However, such reforms will not be made under current political circumstances. Until 
Thailand passes through the dark tunnel of current political turbulence and reaches a 
higher stage of stable, democratic equilibrium, than any sizeable security sector reforms 
will remain unattainable.  
At present, the forces of entrenched arch-royalists continue to acrimoniously square 
off against the forces of Thaksin. Both sides continue to leverage for power in anticipation 
of the impending end of King Bhumipol Adulyadej’s reign. The king, who is beloved by 
almost all Thais, is an ailing octogenarian. There will be no change in the Thaksin-royalist 
equilibrium while Bhumipol continues to live. Likewise, there will be no diminishing of 
the power of the anti-Thaksin military. Only after the royal succession there might be an 
alteration in the balance of power – though a transition to elected civilian supremacy is no 
certainty (the military could actually increase its power). Following the royal succession, 
any potential successes in security sector reform – demilitarization – depend upon the 
ability and will of civilian prime ministers (e.g. Thaksin) to carry this out.  
This does not mean that a return to the years of Thaksin Shinawatra is desirable. As 
noted above, Thaksin did manage to achieve some control over the security sector when 
he was Prime Minister. However, his variant of control was personalized supremacy 
rather than institutionalized control. As with the case of President Ferdinand Marcos in 
the Philippines, such subjective control has tended to be partisan and only lasting as long 
as the charismatic patron remains in office.  
Ultimately, in terms of seriously implementing democracy-based security sector 
reforms as proposed by international entities, it will take several more years before 
Thailand is willing, ready and able to embark on this journey. Yet under Thailand’s 
Unruly Boots: Military Power and Security Sector Reforms Efforts in Thailand 29
 
 
current circumstances as a young democracy with a powerful military which is 
simultaneously experiencing instability, then only security sector reforms of a very 
modest nature can be affected. For example, efforts to root out corruption and enhance 
transparency may be the only goals possible. Any more meaningful reforms are unlikely 
to be realized given present political conditions. Only when stability returns to Thailand, 
there are no longer extremely powerful vested interests hovering over the country and 
democracy has become more embedded it will be possible to return to the security sector 
reforms which were vigorously practiced under the 1997-2001 Chuan Leekpai 
administration. Such reforms sought to institutionalize civilian control and it is thus such 
reforms which Thailand must return to implement and enforce. Yet any renewed effort at 
modifications of this type can only be initiated by Thailand itself with international actors 
offering assistance. Yet for at least the near future, observers will have to expect any SSR 
in Thailand to be a plodding, incremental and timely process. 
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